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Abstract
This Article examines the scope of the so-called ancillary restraints doctrine under European
Community (“EC”) competition law and the legal consequences of its implementation in light of
the administrative practice of the European Commission and the case-law of the European Court
of Justice (“Court of Justice” or “Court”).
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the scope of the so-called ancillary re-
straints doctrine under European Community ("EC") competi-
tion law and the legal consequences of its implementation in
light of the administrative practice of the European Commission
and the case-law of the European Court ofJustice ("Court ofJus-
ice" or "Court").
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty1 prohibits, as incompatible
with the common market, all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted prac-
tices which may affect trade between Member States that have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market.2 Article 85(3), how-
ever, may declare Article 85(1) inapplicable to agreements or
concerted practices that contribute to improving the production
or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic pro-
gress provided that the agreements or practices allow consumers
a fair share of the resulting benefit, do not impose restrictions
on the undertakings that are not indispensable to the attainment
of these objectives, and do not afford such undertakings the pos-
sibility of eliminating competition with respect to a substantial
* Member of the Legal Service, European Commission. A version of this Article
will appear in 1995 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (Barry Hawk ed., 1996). Copyright ©
Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., 1996. The author wishes to thank Mr. Danil
Jowell.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.1 (Cmd. 5179-II)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES [EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
2. Id. art. 85(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
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part of the products in question.3 The power to apply Article
85(1) is shared between the Commission, national courts, and
national authorities entrusted with the task of applying the com-
petition rules of the Treaty at the national level.4 Only the Com-
mission, however, is empowered to grant an exemption under
Article 85(3). 5
The Commission's exclusive right to grant exemptions
under Article 85(3), coupled' with the obligation placed on un-
dertakings to file a notification with the Commission as a legal
condition for obtaining an exemption,6 prompted an important
debate in EC competition law shortly after the EC Treaty en-
tered into force. What was and still is at issue is whether all re-
straints on the freedom of action of undertakings that have an
appreciable effect on market conditions should be regarded as a
violation of Article 85(1) or whether an examination of the over-
all impact of the restriction on competition should be made
before finding a violation of Article 85(1). Under the first ap-
proach, the assessment of the overall competitive impact of re-
stricting the freedom of action of undertakings to determine
their commercial behavior, and/or their possible merits in fur-
thering other Treaty objectives, must only be assessed in the con-
text of Article 85(3). The second approach advocates that the
competitive impact of a restriction should be appraised accord-
ing to the first paragraph of Article 85(1), and views the third
paragraph as a provision essentially designed to exempt restric-
tions having an overall anti-competitive impact on the market.
7
Generally, the Commission has followed the first approach,
while the Court of Justice has not adhered to either approach.-
At the risk of oversimplification, however, it may be said that the
Court has distinguished between vertical and horizontal re-
3. Id. art. 85(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627.
4. See BRT v. SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238. With
regard to national authorities, however, Article 9(3) states that as long as the Commis-
sion has not initiated any procedure under Article 2 or Article 3 the authorities of the
Member States shall remain competent to apply Article 85(1) and Article 86 in accord-
ance with Article 88 of the Treaty. Council Regulation No. 17 J.O. 204/62, at 64
(1962), o.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. at 87 (1959-62) [hereinafter Regulation 17].
5. Regulation 17, supra note 4, art. 9(1).
6. See id. art. 4(1). Article 4(2) of Regulation 17 provides for a limited exception
to this notification obligation. Id. art. 4(2).
7. For an excellent analysis of this debate see RENPJOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN
ANTrrUST LAW (1967).
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straints, hard-core and non-hard-core restraints, and, like the
Commission, ancillary and non-ancillary restraints. With respect
to judicial review of vertical and horizontal restraints under Arti-
cle 85(1), the Court has been more willing to accept a more de-
tailed analysis of the overall competitive, impact of vertical re-
straints than it has been with horizontal restraints.' When re-
viewing cases involving vertical restraints under Article 85(1),
however, the Court has been stricter with respect to hard-core
restrictions, such as absolute territorial protection,9 resale price
maintenance, 10 and concerted refusals to deal than with milder
restrictions of intra-brand competition.1' Finally, in Article
85(1) proceedings, both the Court and the Commission have
permitted a significant number of milder restrictions on both
intra-brand and inter-brand competition, as well as some hard-
core vertical and horizontal restrictions, such as non-competi-
tion clauses' 2 and/or concerted refusals to deal,13 by resorting
explicitly or implicitly to the doctrine of ancillary restraints.
I. THE NOTION OF ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 1N EC
COMPETITION LAW
The first formulation of the doctrine of ancillary restraints
in modern antitrust law can be traced back to Judge.William
8. See Delimitis v. Henninger Brau, Case 234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, [1992] 5
C.M.LR. 210 (ruling on exclusive purchasing); Erauw Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne,
Case 27/87, [1988] E.C.R. 1919, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576 (concerning exclusive licensing
of intellectual property rights); Nungesser v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R.
2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278 (involving exclusive right to produce and distribute); Bras-
serie de Haecht v. Wilkin, Case 48/72, [1973] E.C.R. 77, [1973] C.M.L.R. 287 (discuss-
ing exclusive purchase obligation); Soci&6 Technique Minire v. Ulm, Case 56/65,
[1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357 (discussing exclusive dealing).
9. See Nungesser, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 278; Consten & Grunding
v. Commission, Case 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
10. See Distillers v. Commission, Case 30/78, [1980] E.C.R. 2229, [1980] 3
C.M.L.R. 121.
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving vertical and
horizontal retstraints).
12. See Remia V. Commission, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R.
1; Commission Decision No. 75/95/EEC, O.J. L 38/14 (1975), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D68
[hereinafter SHV/Chevron]; Commission Decision No. 64/502/EEC, J.O. 2287/64
(1964), [1964] C.M.L.R. 505 [hereinafter Nicholas/Vitrapo].
13. In the context of selective distribution and franchising see Metro II v. Commis-
sion, Case 75/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3021, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 118; Pronuptia v. Schigalis,
Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414; Metro I v. Commission, Case
26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
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Taft's decision in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 14 Ac-
cording to Judge Taft:
No conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the
covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main pur-
pose of a lawful contract and necessary to protect the cove-
nantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use
of those fruits by the other party. 15
In current U.S. antitrust practice, the notion of ancillary re-
straints is used essentially as an instrument allowing the applica-
tion of the rule of reason to restrictions, namely horizontal re-
strictions, otherwise falling within the scope of the per se rule.16
With respect to EC competition law, there are essentially
two schools of thought regarding ancillary restraints. 7 Accord-
ing to the first school, the term refers to any clause or restriction
in an agreement that is appreciable and is considered to fall
outside of Article 85(1) . 18 The second school, however, con-
tends that the term ancillary restraints should be used in a more
14. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15. Id. at 282. Taft offered the following examples of ancillary restraints:
(1) by the seller of property or business not to compete with the buyer in such
a way as to derogate from the value of the property or business sold;
(2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm;
(3) by a partner pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere, by
competition or otherwise, with the business of the firm;
(4) by the buyer of property not to use the same in competition with the
business retained by the seller; and
(5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his master or em-
ployer after the expiration of his time of service.
Id.
16. On the notion of ancillary restraints in U.S. antitrust law see Robert H. Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775
(1965); Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do
Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REv. 879 (1980);
Robert H. Bork, Ancillary Restraints Under the Sherman Act In Sale-of-Business Cases and
Know-How Licenses, AMEaiIUC PATENT LAw AssOcIATION BULLETIN 293 (1960). For an
example of the current use of the ancillary restraints doctrine by U.S. courts see
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
17. In this Article, unless otherwise indicated, the second, more restrictive ap-
proach to the use of the term ancillary restraints will be employed. Ancillary restraints
will be regarded as simply one category among several categories of restrictive agree-
ments not falling within Article 85(1).
18. See VALENTINE KoAH, EC COMPETrIoN LAw 148-49 (5th ed. 1994).
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limited set of circumstances.1 9 According to this view, agree-
ments that do not fall within Article 85(1) can be sub-divided
into several different categories. 20 Ancillary restraints are simply
one category of such agreements or restrictions. Other notable
categories are those relating to commercial risk and to selective
distribution systems. 21
Commercial risk cases involve agreements conferring exclu-
sivity on a downstream commercial operator such as a licensee,
franchisee, or distributor. These agreements are considered
necessary in view of the risks undertaken by those downstream
operators who create the market or undertake the investment.
With respect to this category of restrictions, the Court tends to
be more liberal than the Commission and has established a trun-
cated rule of reason to assess the legality of commercial risk pro-
visions under Article 85(1).22
Some scholars who adhere to the stricter definition of ancil-
lary restraints regard them as merely an ad hoc collection of
terms considered "objectively necessary" for the performance of
certain contracts that do not fall within the "commercial risk"
reasoning.23 There is, however, another way of analyzing them.
There is a common thread that binds most of these various re-
strictions referred to as ancillary restraints. More specifically,
the ancillary restraints doctrine is essential to justify restrictions
that are necessary for the full preservation or transfer of value in
certain types of transactions.
The theory that ancillary restraints are restrictions necessary
to preserve or transfer value in a particular transaction is sup-
ported by the following examples. In a know-how licensing
agreement, 4 the licensor wishes to be able to transfer the full
value of his know-how to his licensee while preserving its value
for himself or future licensees after the expiry of the licensing
19. See RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 210-15 (1993) (categorizing agreements
falling outside Article 85(1)).
20. Id. at 210-11.
21. Id. at 214.
22. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving vertical and
horizontal restraints).
23. WHISH, supra note 19, at 210-11.
24. These are agreements whereby one undertaking, the licensor, agrees to com-
municate know-how (technical information that is secret, substantial, and identified in
appropriate form) to another undertaking, the licensee, for explotation in a given terri-
tory.
1996]
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agreement. In order to do so, the licensor will need to ensure
the secrecy of the know-how. This will necessitate the addition
of provisions in the licensing agreement that impose obligations
on the licensee to keep the know-how secret, not to sub-license,
not to use the know-how post term, and possibly, to restrict the
use of the know-how to certain designated fields. Similarly, in a
contract involving the sale of an undertaking, in order to trans-
fer the full value of the business including the goodwill associ-
ated with it and its reputation to customers, it will almost cer-
tainly be necessary for the seller to covenant not to compete with
the buyer of the undertaking for a certain period. Once again,
such a clause is essential for transferring and/or preserving
value in the transaction.
This Article conducts a non-exhaustive investigation into
the veracity of the theory that ancillary restraints aim to preserve
value in various types of transactions.
II. REASONS FOR THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO
ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
Irrespective of the merits of the restrictive approach, some
object to the sub-division of clauses falling outside of Article
85(1), arguing that these categories are artificial. According to
this view, there is little value in maintaining a distinction be-
tween clauses necessary for the preservation or transfer of value
such as ancillary restraints, and those clauses necessary in view of
the commercial risk undertaken by the downstream operator.
Critics further assert that these distinctions have no utility since
both types of restrictions may be equally necessary for the trans-
action to occur.
While there is some validity to this objection, there are, nev-
ertheless, several grounds for attributing some value to the dis-
tinction between ancillary restraints and commercial risk cases,
and, perhaps, additional types of clauses falling outside Article
85(1). First, as a purely descriptive matter, the distinction has
explanatory force in understanding the varied treatment of dif-
ferent clauses in both the case law of the Court and of the Com-
mission. The restrictive approach to ancillary restraints gives a
more precise delineation in viewing the jurisprudence relating
to clauses falling outside Article 85(1), irrespective of whether
one may object to such a delineation on commercial and/or
ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
competition grounds. Second, the restrictive approach to ancil-
lary restraints is also justified by the type of legal analysis applied
in determining their legality under Article 85. Indeed, while
commercial risk clauses usually necessitate an economic analysis
of the market to determine whether they are permissible, ancil-
lary restraints do not require, at least in EC competition law, a
full economic analysis of the market. It is true that even ancil-
lary restraints must satisfy the proportionality test; they must not
go beyond what is necessary for the transaction to occur. The
proportionality test in this context, however, is applied with a
fairly wide margin of appreciation, an approach similar to the
requirement in the common law doctrine of restraint of trade,
which requires that the clauses must be "reasonable." 5 This
proportionality test, however, does not require a full economic
analysis of the market, unlike that required by the Court in cases
such as Sociiti Technique Minire26 and Delimitis.27 As a result of
the absence of a full-blown market analysis, ancillary restraints
are often regarded as per se legal. This, in turn, has the benefi-
cial consequence of granting legal certainty regarding their use
in commercial transactions. This certainty does not exist with
respect to those clauses falling within the commercial risk cate-
gory. Such terms are subject to the vagaries of an economic
analysis of the market either under Article 85(1) or under Arti-
cle 85(3).
III. ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS AND THE RULE OF REASON
Before proceeding to an in-depth analysis of the ancillary
restraints doctrine, it is important to note that there is no neces-
sary 'connection between whether one takes a narrow or broad
view of ancillary restraints and whether one is in favor of a less
restrictive approach with regard to what constitutes a restriction
on competition under Article 85(1). It is true that some who
subscribe to a broader view of the term ancillary restraints also
lament the fact that under EC competition law there is no re-
strictive approach to the application of Article 85(1).28 Con-
versely, some scholars who take a narrower view of ancillary re-
25. See MICHAEL J. TREBLICOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1986).
26. Socidti Technique Miniire, [1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
27. Delimitis, [1991] E.C.R. 935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210.
28. See KoRAH, supra note 18, at 56-60.
1996]
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straints also look with some hesitancy at commercial risk re-
straints and the more liberal jurisprudence of the Court.29 They
regard such cases as damaging to legal certainty.30 It is entirely
consistent, however, to take the restrictive view of ancillary re-
straints as a distinct and separate category of restraints and to
approve the liberal jurisprudence of the Court in the commer-
cial risk cases as a desirable, but nonetheless distinct, supple-
ment to the doctrine of ancillary restraints.
Whether there would still be a role for ancillary restraints if
the Court and the Commission were to go as far as instituting a
full-blown rule of reason is an open question. It is at least argua-
ble that, even under such a scenario, it would be useful to have a
class of restrictions with respect to the legality of which commer-
cial operators could be certain, even in the absence of an eco-
nomic analysis of the market. The extent to which the doctrine
of ancillary restraints can be expanded to include further types
of restrictions is an issue that will have to wait until a full exami-
nation of the theory of the transfer of value with respect to vari-
ous categories of transaction is presented.
IV. TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS
Both the Court and the Commission hold that Article 85(1)
does not apply to non-competition clauses and other restrictions
on the commercial freedom of undertakings when these restric-
tions are imposed in the context of the sale of a business.
One of the first decisions where the Commission developed
its position with regard to ancillary restraints, Reuter/BASF,31 re-
lated precisely to the sale of a business. This case concerned the
non-competition clauses imposed on Dr. Reuter by BASF upon
the transfer of assets from Dr. Reuter to BASF. First, under an
agreement dated June 25, 1971, Dr. Reuter transferred his con-
29. See supra note 8 (discussing cases concerning vertical and horizontal re-
straints).
30. See WHiSH, supra note 19, at 210-11. On the importance of certainty in legal
systems see FRIEDREICH A. VON HAYE . LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973).
31. Commission Decision No. 76/743/EEC, OJ. L 254/40 (1976), [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. D44 [hereinafter Reuter/BASF]. For an early application of the doctrine of
ancillary restraints see Nicholas/Vitrapo, J.O. L 2287/64 (1964), [1964] C.M.L.R. at
505. Nicholas/Vitrapo involved a five-year non-competition clause and an unlimited
time restriction on the use of certain brands following the partial sale of the seller's
business outside the European Community. Id.
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trolling stake in Elastomer AG to BASF. 2 Pursuant to a second
agreement concluded on the same date between Dr. Reuter and
Glasurit, a subsidiary of BASF, Dr. Reuter transferred all of his
know-how and technology in the relevant field to Glasurit, in-
cluding a detailed series of documents containing most of the
scientific and technical data and know-how possessed by Elasto-
mer AG.3 3
These agreements imposed several restraints on Dr. Reu-
ter's future activities. First, Dr. Reuter was prevented from en-
gaging directly or indirectly in any activity in Germany or else-
where in the relevant field for eight years, except for some lim-
ited activities related to the continuation of research and
development on manufacturing processes for related products,
the manufacture of finished parts,34 and the right to perform
some contracts with the former German Democratic Republic. 5
Second, for eight years, Dr. Reuter could not divulge any pro-
tected or unprotected know-how and experience in the relevant
field or any events, circumstances, or facts relating to technical,
commercial, financial, or staffing matters in the companies of
the Elastomer group that arose before the contract was made,
unless they were already well-known or related to the permitted
activities.36 Finally, Dr. Reuter was prevented from carrying out
research in the relevant field.3 7
32. Reuter/BASF, O.J. L 254/40, at 42, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D49. Elastomer AG
comprised a group of undertakings involved in the research, development, manufac-
ture, use, and distribution of chemical products for the production of polyurethanes.
Each undertaking derived semi-manufactured finished products, insofar as they formed
part of the production program of the same, of the group's companies at the time of
the agreement and of all technology, equipment, and apparatus for the processing of
the chemical products for the production of polyurethanes and related products. Id. at
40-41, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D46-D48.
33. Id. at 42-43, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D49-D50.
34. Id. at 43, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D50-D51. Dr. Reuter, however, was obliged,
with respect to factories in which he held shares, to give the Elastomer group priority
with regard to the supply of raw materials, plants, and machinery in the relevant field,
provided that the prices and quality of such items were competitive. BASF was obliged
to accord Dr. Reuter "most-favored-firm" treatment until December 31, 1974. Id.,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D51. In exchange for suitable remuneration, Dr. Reuter was also
obliged to notify the BASF group of all relevant business that became known to him in
the course of his business activity. Id.
35. Id. When exercising these limited rights, Dr. Reuter was required to respect
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The Commission found that the non-competition clauses
eliminated Dr. Reuter as BASF's competitor in the relevant field,
reasoning that, but for the clauses, Dr. Reuter's personal and
technical knowledge and experience would have enabled him to
engage in activity in all the relevant fields covered by the non-
competition clauses."8 He could have developed and exploited
new application processes, even after the transfer of Elastomer
AG to BASF.3 9
In deciding whether these restrictions on Dr. Reuter's com-
mercial freedom violated Article 85(1), and given the fact that
the assets transferred to BASF included both goodwill and know-
how, the Commission considered it necessary to examine the ex-
tent to which the clauses were essential to preserve the trans-
ferred worth of the undertaking and whether the clauses ex-
ceeded what was necessary for such preservation. Since Reuter/
BASF represents the first significant occasion on which the Com-
mission had the opportunity to decide on this issue, it is worth
quoting from the Commission's opinion:
(a) It is recognized that it may be necessary in certain cases
to provide safeguards to ensure the effective performance of
an agreement. These may take the form of a contractual non-
competition clause in cases where not only the material assets
of an undertaking but also its commercial goodwill, including
relations with customers, are to be transferred to the pur-
chaser. In such cases it is essential to prevent a seller from re-
acquiring his old customers either- directly or indirectly
through cooperation with the purchaser's competitors in the
period immediately following the transfer. Compliance by
the seller with such a non-competition clause means no more
than that he must respect his obligation under the agreement
to transfer the full value of the undertaking. Application of
Article 85(1) to such a non-competition clause in an agree-
ment can be excluded in such cases, since it would make
more difficult or even impossible transactions which are gen-
erally recognized as legitimate.
This does not imply that the purchaser may benefit from pro-
tection without limit as to time, since the goodwill of an un-
dertaking enjoys no absolute right of protection. It consists
rather in a purely factual state of affairs which is constantly
38. Id. at 46, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D55.
39. Id.
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exposed to attacks by competing firms. The protection
claimed by a purchaser against the competitive activity of the
seller is justified only on the ground that the seller, as the
former owner of the undertaking, may enjoy an advantage
over outsiders in possessing special information about the un-
dertaking's production and sales situation; this makes him
more dangerous than other competitors. However, this pro-
tection must be limited to the period required by an active
competitive purchaser for him to take over undiminished the
undertaking's market position such as it was at the time of
transfer. Account must be taken of such organizational
problems as may arise until the newly acquired firm has been
integrated into the purchaser's undertaking or group.
(b) It is further recognized that it may be necessary in certain
cases to provide additional safeguards to ensure the effective
performance of an agreement in cases where technical knowl-
edge, constituting an important part of the value of a trans-
ferred undertaking, is placed at the disposal of the transferee.
As in the case of goodwill, it must be possible to prevent the
transferrer for a certain time from using such knowledge in a
manner which would prevent the transferee from acquiring
the undertaking with its market position undiminished.
Here too, the protection afforded to the transferrer should
be limited in time, since the transfer of legally unprotected
know-how confers no exclusive rights on the purchaser ....
[T] he transfer of technical know-how in connection with the
sale of an undertaking does not automatically preclude any
further activity on the part of the seller based on such know-
how. the opportunity of using know-how which is unknown to
competitors is, like goodwill, a competitive advantage. This
advantage can be diminished by the development by third
party competitors of their own know-how in the particular
field of research. Unlike third parties the transferrer of an
undertaking remains aware of the contents of any transferred
know-how, since he cannot divest himself of his own knowl-
edge. For this reason it appears legitimate to protect the
transferee in order for a certain time to enable him to ac-
quire the undertaking with its competitive position undimin-
ished. This need to protect the competitive position of the
undertaking provides the justification for and prescribes the
time limits to any non-competition clause involved.4"
40. Id. at 46-47, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D56-D57. The factors to be taken into ac-
count in determining the duration of the non-competition clauses are: the nature of
the transferred know-how, the opportunities for its use, and the knowledge possessed by
19961
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... In respect of geographical extent and subject matter the
non-competition clause must in normal circumstances be
confined to those markets in which the undertaking was ac-
tive before its sale, or in which it may be regarded as a poten-
tial competitor on the basis of its relevant and demonstrable
activity.4
In applying the aforementioned tests, the Commission found
that the following clauses exceeded what was necessary to secure
the legitimate object of the agreement: (1) the non-competition
clause in so far as it covered non-commercialized research and
development;4" and (2) the non-competition clause restricting
the commercial exploitation of technical knowledge in the areas
covered by the agreement in so far as it exceeded a period of five
years.43
The Commission, however, also held that the five-year non-
competition clause, imposed on the vendor of a business cou-
pled with a know-how exclusive license of the same duration, did
the purchaser. It is also reasonable to assume that the transferee will actively exploit
the assets transferred. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between know-how
existing at the date of transfer and new or further developments in connection with the
transferred know-how. For example, non-competition clauses extending to new or fur-
ther developments can be for a shorter duration. Id. at 47, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D57.
41. Id., [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D57.
42. Id. The Commission held as such because the development by the transferrer
of the results of his research, even to the stage of industrial use, does not breach the
obligation of secrecy or jeopardize achieving the legitimate purpose of the agreement.
The Commission stated:
As long as the transferrer does not exploit the results of his research and de-
velopment activity in such a way as to compete directly or indirectly with the
purchaser of the undertaking, there is no adverse effect either on the under-
takings' market position or on the value of the acquisition, and likewise there
is no risk of customers being taken away.
Id. The Commission also considered that Dr. Reuter would lose touch with scientific
and technical progress if he did not continue his polyurethanes research, where there is
constant innovation. Id., [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D58.
The Commission added that his continuance in research is consistent with the in-
terests of the Community to maintain genuine competition within the common market.
Id. If the prohibition on research and development were upheld, there would be a
danger that Dr. Reuter would be entirely eliminated as a potential competitor. Id. This
prohibition was thus regarded as a clause that was unjustified as a safeguard for the
takeover and which has as its object and effect an appreciable restriction of competi-
tion. Id.
43. Id. The Commission rejected the justifications for the eight-year period origi-
nally foreseen in the agreement including: the need to protect the secrecy of the know-
how; the high costs incurred by BASF in taking over the undertaking; and, the loss of
raw material know-how which Dr. Reuter had formerly received from a third party and
which he refused to continue to supply to BASF. Id. at 48-49, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D59.
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not fall under Article 85(1), provided that the sale included the
transfer of goodwill and technical know-how, and that the sub-
ject matter, duration, and geographical scope of the restrictions
did not exceed what is necessary to guarantee the effective trans-
fer of these assets.' In effect, this ruling enables a purchaser to
fully replace the seller on its market position prior to the acquisi-
tion.
It is important to note that the Commission reached this
conclusion without examining the impact on competition of Dr.
Reuter's elimination as a competitive force. Thus, the legality of
the non-competition clauses in Reuter/BASF did not rest on their
impact on market conditions but rather on their ability to bring
about the transfer of value in terms of goodwill and know-how.
Moreover, as the acquisition of control by BASF did not fall as
such under the scope of application of Article 85(1), the logical
consequence of the Commission's approach was a narrower ap-
plication of Article 85(1) to restrictions on the commercial free-
dom of the seller, which made the transaction possible. In nar-
rowing the application of Article 85(1), the Commission articu-
lated a version of the ancillary restraints doctrine, according to
which, the legality of some restrictions depended exclusively on
their connection to the main transaction and not on their in-
dependent impact on competition.
In the Nutricia45 decision of December 12, 1983, the Com-
mission again had the opportunity to apply its ancillary restraints
doctrine to restrictions imposed in the context of the sale of a
business. This case concerned non-competition clauses con-
tained in agreements for the sale by NVVB Nutricia of its subsidi-
ary, Remia BV, to De Rooij, and the sale of Luycks Producten BV
("Luycks") to Zuid-Hollandse Conservenfabired BV ("Zuid").
Remia was involved in the production of sauces while Luycks es-
sentially produced pickles. According to the agreement con-
cerning the sale of Remia ("Sauce Agreement"), Nutricia would
transfer its shares in Remia to De Rooij, together with the exclu-
sive right to sell consumer products manufactured by or on be-
half of Remia, and the exclusive right to sell in the Netherlands
sauces manufactured by or on behalf of Luycks, whose compli-
44. Id. at 49, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D60.
45. Commission Decision No. 83/670/EEC, O.J. L 376/22 (1983), [1984] 2
C.M.L.R. 165 [hereinafter Nutricia].
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ance Nutricia guaranteed.46 Against this backdrop, Nutricia un-
dertook not to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production
or sale of sauces on the Dutch market for a period of ten years
and ensured that Luycks would comply with this restriction.47
De Rooij was also given a non-exclusive right to use the trade-
mark "Luycks" for some sauces for two years with respect to sales
to the hotel and catering trade.48 Pursuant to the agreement
relating to the sale of Luycks ("Pickles Agreement"), Nutricia al-
lowed Zuid to use Nutricia's sale force on a non-exclusive basis
in the Dutch market and in the Belgian and German export
markets for a period of one year.49 As in the Sauce Agreement,
the Pickles Agreement required Nutricia not to engage, directly
or indirectly, for five years, in any production or sale of pickles
or condiments in European countries.50 Failure to comply with
this provision could trigger penalties, which were quantified in
the Pickles Agreement.51 The Pickles Agreement also extended
the non-competition clause contained in the Sauce Agreement
to Luycks-Zuid, concerning Luycks' future activities in the sauce
market.52
In its legal assessment, the Commission essentially followed
the approach developed in Reuter/BASF. Accordingly, it stated
that when the sale of a business involves the transfer not only of
material assets but also of goodwill and clientele it may be neces-
sary to impose on the seller contractual restrictions on competi-
tion.53 The Commission also stressed that the level of protection
accorded tothe purchaser must be limited to what is objectively
necessary for the purchaser to assume, by active competitive be-
havior, the place in the market previously occupied by the
46. Id. at 25, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 171.
47. Id.
48. Id.




53. Id. at 26, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 172-73. The Commission provided a number of
criteria to be used in determining the necessary duration of the restrictions. Id. These
criteria include: internal documentation of the parties at the time of the sale, the time
it will take the purchaser to build up a clientele, the degree of brand loyalty, the time
lapse required to enter the market or to have a new trade mark accepted by the con-
sumer, and the time required by the seller to make a successful comeback such as the
degree of technological sophistication of the products and the degree of financial
strength of the purchaser. Id., [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 173.
ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
seller.5 4 With regard to the geographical scope of the non-com-
petition clause, the Commission appeared to depart from its pre-
vious approach in Reuter/BASF by deciding that, as a rule, the
provision should only cover the geographical markets where the
products concerned were manufactured or sold at the time of
the agreements.55
The most relevant innovation introduced by the Commis-
sion in Nutricia, however, was the extension of the ancillary re-
straints doctrine to the imposition of non-competition clauses
on third parties. Indeed, the Commission implied that the im-
position of a four-year non-competition clause on Zuid upon the
sale of Luycks would not violate Article 85(1) in so far as the
restriction would simply reflect that imposed in relation with Nu-
tricia.56 The legal test articulated by the Commission requires
that a non-competition clause imposed on the buyer in the sec-
ond transaction does no more than reflect the non-competition
clause imposed upon the seller in the first transaction, and
where the first non-competition clause is deemed ancillary, then
the second must also be regarded as ancillary.
On appeal, the Court affirmed the Commission's ap-
proach.5 7 Regarding the applicability of Article 85(1) to non-
competition clauses in the context of the sale of a business, the
Court stated that in order to determine whether or not such
clauses fall within the prohibition in Article 85 (1) it is necessary
to examine the competitive environment as if those clauses did
not exist.5 If, in the absence of such clauses, the vendor and the
purchaser would have remained competitors after the transfer,
the agreement for the transfer of the undertaking could not
have been given effect. The vendor, with his particularly de-
54. Id. The Commission also stated that the period of protection will not be ex-
tended even if the objective minimum appears insufficient as a result of an earlier man-
agement decision on the part of the purchaser. Id. In regard to the Sauce Agreement,
the Commission decided that the non-competition clause provided could only be con-
sidered as ancillary for a period of four years. Id. at 27, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 174. As to
the Pickles Agreement, the Commission only accepted a two-year non-competition
clause limited to the Dutch, Belgian, and German markets. Id. The applications for
exemption under Article 85(3) were refused. Id. at 28, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 175-76.
55. Id. at 26, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 173-74. The application of this general rule in
this case, however, does seems justified since Nutricia had no reputation in markets
outside the Netherlands. Id. at 27, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 174.
56. See id. at 27, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at'174.
57. Reraia, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.LR. 1.
58. Id. at 2571, 1 18, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. at 28.
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tailed knowledge of the transferred undertaking, would still be
in a position to win back his former customers immediately after
the transfer and thereby drive the undertaking out of business.59
As a result, non-competition clauses incorporated in an agree-
ment for the transfer of an undertaking, in principle, have the
merit of ensuring that the transfer has the effect intended.
These clauses, by virtue of that fact, contribute to the promotion
of competition because they lead to an increase in the number
of undertakings in the market in question.6" Nevertheless, in or-
der to have a beneficial effect on competition, such clauses must
be necessary to the transfer of the undertaking concerned, and
their duration and scope must be strictly limited to that pur-
pose.6'
While the Court initially seemed to base the non-applicabil-
ity of Article 85(1) to non-competition clauses on the sale of a
business on a pro-competitive merits analysis, it essentially en-
dorsed the Commission's test based on the necessity of the
clause to make the transfer of assets fully effective. Indeed, the
Court did not require, that in implementing the "necessity test,"
the Commission take into account the degree of actual and po-
tential competition on the relevant market at the time of the
sale. Nor did the Court require the Commission to undertake a
detailed examination of the competitive situation in the relevant
market before and after the transaction in order to decide
whether the need to guarantee the full transfer of the assets took
precedence over the need to preserve and/or develop effective
competition.
The Commission further developed its approach in Me-
caniver/PPG.62 In this decision, the Commission considered not
only the possible applicability of Article 85(1) to the sale of the
business and ancillary agreements, but also the potential applica-
bility of Article 86.63 With respect to Article 86, the Commission
held that given the conditions of effective competition prevailing
59. Id. at 2571, 19, (1987] 1 C.M.L.R. at 28.
60. Id. at 2571, 20, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. at 28.
61. Id.
62. Commission Decision No. 85/78/EEC, OJ. L 35/54 (1985), [1985] 3 C.M.L.R.
359 [hereinafter Mecaniver/PPG].
63. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28. "Any abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so
far as it may affect trade." Id.
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in the market, the application of that Article was not justified.64
In holding as such the Commission implied that its approach to
the non-competition clause contained in the sale agreement
could ' have been different had the transaction given rise to a
strengthening of a dominant position.6"
In BPCL/IC16 and ENI/Montedison,67 two subsequent deci-
sions reviewing agreements concerning the restructuring of the
European petrochemical industry, the Commission adopted a
more cautious approach with respect to non-competition and re-
lated clauses applied in transactions involving the transfer of un-
dertakings. Both decisions concerned asset swap arrangements
coupled with the concurrent closure of some production capac-
ity and transitional cooperation agreements for the operation of
the newly acquired assets between BPCL and ICI and between
ICI and ENI, respectively.6" Each individual transaction could
have been viewed simply as a sale of a business accompanied by
transitional arrangements designed to ensure the effectiveness
of the transfers, but the Commission held that the agreements in
question constituted agreements and concerted practices within
the meaning of Article 85(1) .69
64. Mecaniver/PPG, O.J. L 35/54, at 57 (1985), [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 364-65.
65. Id.
66. Commission Decision No. 84/387/EEC, O.J. L 212/1 (1984), [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 330 [hereinafter BPCL/ICI].
67. Commission Decision No. 87/3/EEC, O.J. L 5/13 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R.
444 [hereinafter ENI/Montedison].
68. BPCL/ICI, O.J. L 212/1 (1984), [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 330; ENI/Montedison, O.J.
L 5/13 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 444. More particularly, BPCL/ICI concerned the
agreements between BPCL and ICI for the mutual sale of certain production units,
technical know-how, goodwill for polyvinyl chloride ("PVC") and low-density polyethyl-
ene ("LDPE"), and related agreements concerning the operation and further sale of
the plant by the new owners. BPCL/ICI, O.J. L 212/1, at 1 (1984), [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at
333. The opinion also concerned the decision of BPCL to close down its PVC and
chlorine wedge production units not involved in the agreements, the decision of ICI to
close down certain of its LDPE and ethylene production units not involved in the agree-
ments, the agreements to change the capacity rights in a jointly owned ethylene
cracker, and supply agreements between BPCL and ICI for polyethylene and ethylene.
Id.
69. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626. Article 85(1)
prohibits "all agreements between undertakings... and concerted practices which may
affect trade between member-States and which has as their object of effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market." Id. The
agreements in question include the sale both of the most modern plants and of all of
the parties' goodwill on the respective markets with the implied obligation not to com-
pete and the subsequent closures of the plants not specifically included in the same
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According to the Commission, the result of the agreements
and subsequent plant closures was a specialization of production
and an agreement to limit capacity in the United Kingdom in
that ICI abandoned the production of low-density polyethylene
("LDPE") in the United Kingdom, specializing instead in polyvi-
nyl chloride ("PVC"), and BPCL totally abandoned the produc-
tion of PVC, specializing instead in LDPE.7° Consequently, com-
petition was restricted appreciably for both products because
each party was an important and active competitor before the
agreements and remained so after their implementation.7 1
With regard to the non-competition clause, the Commission
decided that both BPCL and ICI's sales of their most-modern
PVC and LDPE plants, respectively, and all the U.K. goodwill,
which prohibited the seller from canvassing his former custom-
ers for a reasonable period, effectively precluded the seller from
competing with the purchaser, thus, implicitly forcing the for-
mer to close all their remaining plants not involved in the deal.7 2
The Commission concluded that the sale of all the parties' good-
will on the respective markets amounted implicitly to an obliga-
tion not to compete and was not simply ancillary to the transfer
of the assets because the goodwill was being transferred without
the plant to which it belonged and because of the reciprocal na-
ture of these transfers.73
The Commission also adhered to this position in ENI/
Montedison.7 ' The Commission held that the non-competition
agreements. BPCL/ICI, O.J. L 212/1, at 5 (1984), [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 339; see ENI/
Montedison, O.J. L 5/13, at 16 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 450-51.
70. BPCL/ICI, O.J. L 212/1, at 5-6 (1984), [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 339-40.
71. See id. at 6, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 340.
72. This analysis essentially applied to BPCL since ICI retained some plants on the
Continent.
73. BPCL/ICI, O.J. L 212/1, at 8 (1984), [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 345-46.
74. ENI/Montedison, O.J. L 5/13, at 17 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 452. The
decision stated:
In the circumstances of the present case, the economic effects of the recipro-
cal asset swaps must be seen as a whole: the result is a defacto specialization
accompanied by concerted action to reduce capacity. In addition . . . both
parties still remain actual and potential competitors, even though they are
forbidden for a time from competing. Furthermore, the parties have not with-
drawn completely from the sector and they are dependent on each others'
cooperation for the continued effective operation of certain of their newly
acquired assets. Therefore it cannot be argued that the agreements constitute
simple assets transfers outside the scope of Article 85(1) ....
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clauses and related arrangements, while ensuring the effective-
ness of the transfer of assets, were also part of a wider scheme
designed to restrict competition by way, in particular, of a spe-
cialization agreement.
75
Although these two cases should not be seen as a departure
from the Commission's previous approach to ancillary restraints,
they illustrate how the Commission's perception of the main ob-
jective of the transaction determines the fate of restrictions that,
on their face, should normally fall under the ancillary restraints
category.
Following the entry into force of the Merger Regulation
76
("Merger Regulation"), the Commission issued a Notice 77 ("An-
cillary Notice"), stating the interpretation it would thereafter
give to the notion of "restrictions directly related and necessary
to the implementation of the concentration" both in general
terms and to specific clauses, including: non-competition cove-
nants, licenses of industrial and commercial property rights and
know-how, and purchase and supply agreements usually in-
cluded in the different types of transactions covered by the Reg-
ulation, such as transfers of undertakings, joint ventures, and
joint acquisitions. 78 Although these guidelines only apply to
75. Id. at 16-18, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 450-53. It is worth noting that in applying
Article 85(3) to the obligation not to canvass each other's customers the Commission
applied, in the BPCL/ICI decision, the traditional test of ancillarity developed in its
previous administrative practice. BPCI/ICI, 0.J. L 212/1, at 10 (1984), [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. at 346-47. This approach, however, was not followed in the subsequent ENI/
Montedison decision where the five-year non-competition clause was exempted without
any elaborate analysis regarding its indispensability. ENI/Montedison, 0J. L 5/13, at
19 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 456.
76. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, 0J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in 0J. L
257/13 (1990). Recital 25 of the this Regulation ("Merger Regulation")states that "this
Regulation should still apply where the undertakings concerned accept restrictions di-
rectly related and necessary to implementation of the concentration." Id., 0J. L 257/
13, at 16 (1990). The Merger Regulation also provides that "[tihe decision declaring
the concentration compatible [with the common market] shall also cover restrictions
directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration." Id. art.
8(2). 0J. L 257/13, at 19 (1990).
77. Commission Notice, 0J. C 203/05 (1990) [hereinafter Ancillary Notice].
78. For an early analysis of the 1990 Notice see Donald L. Holley, AncilUary Restric-
tions in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 1990 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 423 (B. Hawk ed. 1990).
For a detailed analysis of the Commission's application of the 1990 Notice up to 1992
see JONES & GONZALEZ, THE EEC MERGER REGULATION (1992). For a more recent analy-
sis of the Commission's implementation of the 1990 Notice with particular regard to
non-competition clauses see James R. Modrall, Ancillary Restrictions in the Commission's
Decisions under the Merger Regulation: Non-competition Clauses, [1995] 1 E.C.L.R. 40.
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Community dimension operations 79 as defined by Article 1 of
the Regulation, 80 it can be safely anticipated that the Commis-
sion will apply these principles to ancillary restraints imposed in
the context of concentrations falling below the thresholds.
The Ancillary Notice sets out the following principles of
evaluation:
3. The 'restrictions' meant are those agreed on between the
parties to the concentration which limit their own freedom of
action in the market. They do not include restrictions to the
detriment of third parties. If such restrictions are the inevita-
ble consequence of the concentration itself, they must be as-
sessed together with it under the provisions of Article 2 of the
Regulation. If, on the contrary, such restrictive effects on
third parties are separable from the concentration they may,
if appropriate, be the subject of an assessment of compatibil-
ity with Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
4. For restrictions to be considered 'directly related' they
must be ancillary to the implementation of the concentra-
tion, that is to say subordinate in importance to the main ob-
ject of the concentration. They cannot be substantial restric-
tions wholly different in nature from those which result from
the concentration itself. Neither are they contractual ar-
rangements which are among the elements constituting the
concentration, such as those establishing economic unity be-
tween previously independent parties, or organizing joint
control by two undertakings of another undertaking. As inte-
gral parts of the concentration, the latter arrangements con-
stitute the very subject matter of the evaluation to be carried
out under the Regulation.
Also excluded, for concentrations which are carried out in
stages, are the contractual arrangements relating to the stages
before the establishment of control within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 3, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Regulation. For these, Arti-
cles 85 and 86 remain applicable as long as the conditions set
out in Article 3 are not fulfilled.
The notion of directly related restrictions likewise excludes
from the application of the Regulation additional restrictions
agreed at the same time which have no direct link with the
concentration. It is not enough that the additional restric-
tions exist in the same context as the concentration.




5. The restrictions must likewise be 'necessary to the imple-
mentation of the concentration', which means that in the ab-
sence the concentration could not be implemented or could
only be implemented under more uncertain conditions, at
substantially higher cost, over an appreciably longer period
or with considerably less probability of success. This must be
judged as an objective basis.
6. The question of whether a restriction meets those condi-
tions cannot be answered in general terms. In particular as
concerns the necessity of the restriction, it is proper not only
to take account of its nature, but equally to ensure, in apply-
ing the rule of proportionality, that its duration and subject
matter, and geographic field of application, do not exceed
what the implementation of the concentration reasonably re-
quires. If alternatives are available for the attainment of the
legitimate aim pursued, the undertakings must choose the
one which is objectively the least restrictive of competition."1
With regard to non-competition clauses, the Commission es-
sentially codified its former administrative practice. 2 According
to the Commission, ancillary restrictions that meet the criteria
set out in the Regulation are contractual prohibitions on compe-
tition imposed on the vendor in the context of a concentration
achieved by the transfer of an undertaking or part of an under-
taking. 3 Such prohibitions guarantee that the acquirer receives
the full value of the assets transferred, which, in general, include
both physical assets and intangible assets such as the goodwill
that the vendor has accumulated or the know-how he has devel-
oped. These restrictions are not only directly related to the con-
centration, but are also necessary for its implementation be-
cause, in their absence, there would be reasonable grounds to
expect that the sale of the undertaking or part of an undertaking
could not be accomplished satisfactorily. In order to assume full
control over the value of the assets transferred, the acquirer
must be able to protect itself against the competitive acts of the
vendor in order to gain the loyalty of customers and to assimilate
and exploit the know-how. Such protection is not generally con-
sidered necessary when the transfer is defacto limited to physical
assets such as land, buildings, machinery, or to exclusive indus-
81. Ancillary Notice, O.J. C 203/05, at 5-6 (1990).
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. Id. at 7.
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trial and commercial property rights where the holders could
immediately take action against infringements by the transferor
of such rights.
Such a restriction on competition, however, is justified only
where the concentration in terms of its duration, its geographi-
cal field of application, its subject matter, and the persons sub-
ject to it, do not exceed what is reasonably necessary to that
end.84
Protection of the vendor is not normally an ancillary restric-
tion and is, therefore, examined under Articles 85 and 86 of the
EC Treaty.85 The vendor may bind himself, and his subsidiaries
84. Id. at 6. With regard to the acceptable duration of a prohibition on competi-
tion, the Commission has deemed five years as an appropriate period of time when the
transfer of the undertaking includes the goodwill and know-how, and a period of two
years when it includes only the goodwill. Id. These, however, are not absolute rules;
they do not preclude a prohibition of longer duration in particular circumstances. For
example, the parties can demonstrate that customer loyalty will persist for a period
longer than two years or that the economic life cycle of the products concerned is
longer than five years and should, therefore, be taken into account. Id.
Similarly, the geographic scope of the non-competition clause must be limited to
the area where the vendor had established its products or services before the transfer.
Id. It does not appear objectively necessary that the acquirer be protected from compe-
tition by the vendor in territories which the vendor had not previously penetrated. Id.
In the same manner, the competition clause must be limited to products and serv-
ices which form the economic activity of the undertaking transferred. Id. In particular,
in the case of a partial transfer of assets, it does not appear that the acquirer needs to be
protected from the competition of the vendor in the products or services which consti-
tute the activities which the vendor retains after the transfer. Id.
85. The Commission has applied the above-mentioned principles in a substantial
number of the following unreported cases. See, e.g., Mitsubishi/UCAR. Decision of
04.01,91, Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, Decision of 08.02.91, ASKO/Omni, Deci-
sion of 21.02.91, Digitial/Kienzle, Decision of 22.02.91, ASKO/Jacobs/ADIA. Decision
of 16.05.91, Conagra/Idea, Decision of 30.05.91, RVI/VBC/Heuliez, Decision of
03.06.91, RVI/VBC/Heuliez, Decision of 03.06.91, VIAG/Continental Can, Decision of
06.06.91, Sanofi/Sterling Drug, Decision of 10.06.91, P~chiney/Usinor-Sacilor, Deci-
sion of 24.06.91, Drdger/IBM/HMP, Decision of 28.06.91, ICL/Nokia Data, Decision of
17.07.91, Digital/Philips, Decision of 02.09.91, ABC/Gn~rale des Eaux/Canal /W.H.
Smith TV, Decision of 10.09.91, Thomson/Pilkington, Decision of 23.10.91, Lucas/Ea-
ton, Decision of 09.12.91, Ingersoll Rand/Dresser, Decision of 18.12.91, Courtaulds/
SNIA, Decision of 19.12.91, VIAG/Brfihl, Decision of 19.12.91, Volvo/Atlas, Decision of
14.01.92, Inchcape/IEP, Decision of 21.02.92, Ericsson/Kolbe, Decision of 22.01.92,
Tarmac Steetley, Decision of 12.02.92, Thorn EMI/Virgin Music, Decision of 27.04.92,
Eureko, Decision of 27.04.92, Herba/IRR, Decision of 28.04.92, Solvay/Laporte, Deci-
sion of 30.04.92, Mondi/Frantschach, Decision of 12.05.92, Ericsson/Ascom, Decision
of 08.07.92, GECC/Avis, Decision of 15.07.92, Elf Atochem/Rohm & Haas, Decision of
28.07.92, Pepsi Co/General Mills, Decision of 05.08.92, Pechiney/VIAG, Decision of
10.08.92, Rh6ne-Poulenc/SNIA, Decision of 10.08.92, Northern Telecom/Matra Com-
munication, Decision of 10.08.92, BTR/Pirelli, Decision of 17.08.92, Avesta/British
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and commercial agents. An obligation to impose similar restric-
tions on others, however, would not qualify as an ancillary re-
striction. This applies in particular to clauses that would restrict
the scope for resellers or users to import or export.86
As to licenses of industrial and commercial property rights
and know-how, the Commission's position is the following: the
transfer of an undertaking or part of an undertaking generally
includes the transfer to the acquirer, with a view to the full ex-
ploitation of the assets transferred, of rights to industrial or com-
mercial property or know-how.87 The vendor may, however, re-
main the owner of the rights in order to exploit them for activi-
ties other than those transferred.8" In these cases, the usual
means for ensuring that the acquirer will have the full use of the
assets transferred is to conclude licensing agreements in his
favor.
Simple or exclusive licenses of patents, similar rights, or ex-
isting know-how can be accepted as necessary for the completion
of the transaction, as well as agreements to grant such licenses.
License agreements may restrict certain fields of use to the ex-
tent that they correspond to the activities of the undertakings
transferred. Normally, it will not be necessary for such licenses
to include territorial limitations on manufacturing, which reflect
the territory of the activity transferred. Licenses may be granted
for the whole duration of the patent or similar rights, or the du-
ration of the normal economic life of the know-how. As such
licenses are the economic equivalent to a partial transfer of
Steel/NCC, Decision of 04.09.92, Linde/Fiat, Decision of 28.09.92, Rh6ne-Poulenc
Chimie/SITA, Decision of 26.11.92, British Airways/TAT, Decision of 27.11.92, Waste
Management/SAE, Decision of 21.12.92, Tesco/Catteau, Decision of 04.02.93, Sara
Lee/BP Food Division, Decision of 08.02.93, Matra/Cap Gemini Sogeti, Decision of
17.03.93, Harrisons & Crossfield/Akzo, Decison of 29.04.93, Aegon/Scottish Equitable,
Decision of 25.06.93, BHF/CCF/Charterhouse, Decision of 30.08.93, Arvin/Sogefi, De-
cision of 23.09.93, American Cyanamid/Shell, Decision of 01.10.93, Synthomer/Yule
Catto, Decision of 22.10.93, Mc Cormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, Decision of
06.10.93, SNECMA/TI, Decision of 17.01.94, Neste/Statoil, Decision of 17.02.94, ABB/
Renault, Decision of 09.03.94, CGP/GEC Alsthom/KPR/Kone, Decision of 14.04.94,
AGF/La Uni6n y El F nix, Decision of 25.04.94, Allied Lyons/HWE-Pedro Domecq,
Decision of 28.04.94, ERG/NRG Victory, Decision of 27.05.94, GKN/Brambles/Leto
Recycling, Decision of 07.06.94.
86. But see Nutricia, OJ. L 376/22, at 23 (1984), [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 168-69
(holding this type of clause to be acceptable).
87. Ancillary Notice, OJ. L 203/05, at 7 (1990).
88. Id.
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rights, they need not be limited in time. Restrictions in license
agreements, other than those described above, fall outside the
scope of the Regulation. They must be assessed on their merits
according to Article 85(1) and Article 85(3).
By analogy, the same principles apply to trademark licenses,
business names, or similar rights where the vendor wishes to re-
main the owner of such rights in relation to activities retained
while the acquirer needs the rights to use and market the prod-
ucts that are the object of the activity of the undertaking or part
of an undertaking transferred. In such circumstances, the con-
clusion of agreements for the purpose of avoiding confusion be-
tween trademarks may be necessary.8 9
As to purchase and supply agreements, the Commission rec-
ognizes that the transfer of an undertaking or part of an under-
taking, in many cases, may entail the disruption of traditional
lines of internal procurement and supply resulting from the pre-
vious integration of activities within the economic entity of the
vendor. To make possible the break-up of the economic unity of
the vendor and the partial transfer of the assets to the acquirer
under reasonable conditions, it is often necessary to maintain, at
least for a transitional period, similar links between the vendor
and the acquirer. This objective is normally achieved through
the use of purchase and supply agreements between the vendor
and the acquirer of the undertaking or part of an undertaking.
Taking account of the particular situation resulting from the
break-up of the economic unity of the vendor, such obligations
which can sometimes lead to restrictions of competition, can be
recognized as ancillary as they may benefit the vendor as well as
the acquirer.
The legitimate aim of such obligations may be to ensure the
continuity of supply to one or the other of the parties of prod-
89. See, e.g., Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, Decision of 08.02.91, Thomson/
Pilkington, Decision of 23.10.91, Courtaulds/SNIA, Decision of 19.12.91, Grand Metro-
politan/Cinzano, Decision of 07.02.92, GECC/Avis, Decision of 15.07.92, Elf Atochem/
Rohm & Haas, Decision of 28.07.92, Northern Telecom/Matra Communication, Deci-
sion of 10.08.92, BTR/Pirelli, Decision of 17.08.92, Avesta/British Steel/NCC, Decision
of 04.09.92, CCIE/GTE, Decision of 25.09.92, Linde/Fiat, Decision of 28.09.92, Ahold/
Jeronimo Martins, Decision of 29.09.92, British Airways/TAT, Decision of 27.11.92,
Waste Management/SAE, Decision of 21.12.92, Harrisons & Crossfield/Akzo, Decision
of 29.04.93, BHF/CCF/Charterhouse, Decision of 30.08.93, Arvin/Sogefi, Decision of
23.09.93, American Cyanamid/Shell, Decision of 01.10.93, UAP/VINCI, Decision of
01.12.93, SNECMA/TI, Decision of 17.01.94.
ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
ucts necessary to the activities retained for the vendor or taken
over for the acquirer. Thus, there are grounds for recognizing,
for a transitional period, the need for supply obligations aimed
at guaranteeing the quantities previously supplied within the
vendor's integrated business or enabling their adjustment in ac-
cordance with the development of the market.
The aim of purchase and supply agreements may also be to
provide continuity of outlets for one or the other of the parties,
as they were previously assured within the single economic en-
tity. For the same reason, obligations providing for fixed quanti-
ties, possibly with a variation clause, may be recognized as neces-
sary.
According to the Commission, however, there does not ap-
pear to be a general justification for exclusive purchase or supply
obligations. Save in exceptional circumstances, for example, the
absence of a market or the specificity of products, the Commis-
sion does not view such exclusivity as objectively necessary to per-
mit the implementation of a concentration in the form of a
transfer of an undertaking or part of an undertaking.9' The un-
dertakings concerned are thus bound to consider whether or
not there are alternative means to the ends pursued, such as
agreements for fixed quantities, which are less restrictive than
exclusivity. Further, the duration of procurement and supply
obligations must be limited to the time period necessary for the
relationship of dependency to be replaced by autonomy in the
market. The duration of such a period must be objectively justi-
fied.91
90. Commission Notice, O.J. L 203/10, at 11 (1990) [hereinafter Undertakings
Notice].
91. See Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, Decision of 08.02.91, Otto/Grattan, Deci-
sion of 21.03.91, ICL/Nokia Data, Decision of 17.07.91, Digital/Philips, Decision of
02.09.91, Courtaulds/SNIA, Decision of 19.12.91, Tarmac Steetly, Decision of 12.02.92,
Generali/BCHA, Decision of 06.04.92, Solvay/Laporte, Decision of 30.04.92, Thomas
Cook/LTU/West LB, Decision of 14.07.92, GECC/Avis, Decision of 15.07.92, Elf
Atochem/Rohm & Haas, Decision of 28.07.92, Rh6ne-Poulenc/SNIA, Decision of
10.08.92, BTR/Pirelli, Decision of 17.08.92, Avesta/British Steel/NCC, Decision of
04.09.92, CCIE/GTE, Decision of 25.09.92, Mannesmann/Hoesch, Decision of
12.11.92, Rh6ne-Poulenc Chimie/SITA, Decision of 26.11.92, British Airways/TAT, De-
cision of 27.11.92, BHF/CCF/Charterhouse, Decision of 30.08.93, Rh6ne-Poulenc/
SNIA(II), Decision of 08.09.93, American Cyanamid/Shell, Decision of 01.10.93, Pilk-
ington Techint/SIV, Decision of 21.12.93, SNECMA/TI, Decision of 17.01.94, Mannes-
mann/Vallourec/Ilva, Decision of 31.01.94, ABB/Renault, Decision of 09.03.94. (apply-
ing principles set forth by Commission).
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V. JOINT VENTURES
SHVI/Chevron92 was the first Commission decision to ex-
amine ancillary restraints in the context of joint venture93 agree-
ments. This case concerned SHV and Chevron, two companies
involved in the petroleum industry, and their establishment of
jointly and equally owned subsidiaries to sell certain petroleum
products in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany,
and Denmark, where they previously had independent distribu-
tion networks.94 These pre-existing independent distribution
networks were transferred to the joint venture as a result of the
agreements.9" As for the petroleum products covered by the
agreements, the parent companies agreed not to compete
against each other for fifty years, which was the duration of the
agreements, without the prior consent of the other. 96
After determining that thejoint venture agreements created
a concentration between each of the parent companies and their
joint subsidiaries, and that the agreements relating to the distri-
bution of the products specified by the agreements did not con-
tain any clause that restricted competition between Chevron and
SHV in areas other than those covered by the joint subsidiaries,
the Commission held that:
As regards distribution of the products covered by the
agreement, Chevron and SHV have each agreed not to com-
pete with the other without the prior consent of the other.
This clause provides SHV with the assurance that the assets
transferred by it to the joint subsidiaries will not lose value as
a result of competition by Chevron with those subsidiaries. In
view of the fact that Chevron has no industrial or commercial
interest which could imaginably lead it to compete with its
own 50% - owned subsidiaries, and given also that SHV will
disappear as an independent Wholesaler on the petroleum
92. SHV/Chevron, OJ. L 38/14 (1975), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D68.
93. For the purpose of this Article, the term joint venture means: cooperativejoint
venture as defined by the Commission in its Notice concerning the assessment of coop-
erative joint ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty and concentrative joint
venture as defined in its Notice concerning the distinction between concentrative and
cooperative joint ventures. Commission Notice, OJ. C 43/2 (1993) [hereinafter Coop-
erative Joint Venture Notice]; Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. C 385/2 (1994)
[hereinafter Concentrative Joint Venture Notice].




product market, with no likelihood of ever returning, the
clause in question cannot be said to involve an appreciable
restriction of competition.
The foregoing analysis is not affected by the fact that
SHV, which jointly with other companies holds exploration
licenses for the North Sea, might come into possession of
crude oil, since SHV's freedom to sell its crude oil to any
buyer is unlimited.9
7
Although the Commission's analysis of the non-competition
clause rests essentially on the clause's lack of appreciable effect
on competition given the very limited possibilities of re-entry by
the parent companies on the joint venture's product and geo-
graphical markets, the decision also stressed the need to protect
the value of the assets transferred to the joint venture and, in
particular, those of SHV who had less objective possibilities to re-
enter the market.98 This latter assessment is similar to the assess-
ment of non-competition clauses carried out in the context of
the transfer of undertakings in that the non-applicability of Arti-
cle 85(1) is justified by the need to protect the full value of the
transfer. The Commission has followed the approach set forth
in SHVI/Chevron, although there was a substantial time-gap
before its subsequent administrative practice. 99
In its 1990 decision, Elopak/Metal Box-Odin,1"' the Commis-
sion explicitly applied the ancillary restraints doctrine in a nega-
tive clearance decision to a number of contractual restrictions
on the commercial freedom of action of the parties to a joint
97. Id. at 15, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at D70-D71.
98. Id. In other geographic areas, Chevron apparently remained active in the joint
venture product market. See id.
99. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra was the first Commission decision after SHV/Chevron
where this doctrine was applied. Commission Decision No. 87/100/EEC, O.J. L 41/31
(1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111 (Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra). The restriction under scrutiny
in this decision concerned an obligation imposed on the joint venture not to manufac-
ture or deal in products competing with the licensed products. Id. at 33, [1988] 4
C.M.L.R. at 113. This obligation was considered necessary in order to protect the con-
siderable capital investment and technology transfer. Id. at 33-36, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at
118-22. The Commission explicitly concluded that the restriction did not constitute an
appreciable restriction of competition. Id. Other Commission decisions and the Coop-
erative Joint Venture Notice later confirmed that the underlying rationale for the non-
applicability of Article 85(1) was also that of the ancillary restraints doctrine. Coopera-
tive Joint Venture Notice, OJ. C 43/2, at 13 (1993).
100. Commission Decision No. 90/410/EEC, O.J. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 832 [hereinafter Elopak/Metal Box-Odin].
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venture agreement. 0 1 Elopak/Metal Box-Odin concerned the es-
tablishment of ajoint venture, Odin, and related agreements be-
tween Elopak and Metal Box, two companies involved inter alia
in the packaging business, who sought to conduct research and
develop a container with a carton base and separate closure that
could be filled by an aseptic process with UHT processed
foods. °2 The joint venture was also established to develop the
machinery and technology for filling these new containers and,
if successful, to produce and distribute the new containers and
their filling machines. 10 3 After deciding that the creation of the
joint venture itself did not fall under Article 85(1),1°4 the Com-
mission analyzed a number of related clauses and held that while
they restricted the commercial freedom of action of the parent
companies and/or thejoint venture, they did not restrict compe-
tition within the meaning of Article 85(1).105
The following restrictions relating to the activities of the
parent companies and/or the joint venture were considered an-
cillary: (1) the grant to the joint venture by the parent compa-
nies of the exclusive right to exploit anywhere in the world all
their respective intellectual property rights relevant for the field
of the agreement, which was very narrowly defined to include
only the highly specific product in question, for the duration of
the joint venture agreement; 10 6 (2) the obligation imposed on
the joint venture not to use the intellectual property rights li-
censed for any purpose other than in the field of the agreement
and to keep the information confidential; 10 7 (3) the right of first
refusal granted to the parent companies to exploit the joint ven-
ture's new technology when this technology is offered by the
joint ventures to third parties;10 8 (4) the provisions relating to
the non-exclusive license of improvements that may be granted
by Odin to its parents and the limitations placed on the parents
on the use of these technological improvements licensed




104. Id. at 19, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 841.
105. Id. at 21, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 844.
106. Id. at 20, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 842.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 21, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 844.
109. Id. at 20, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 843.
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its parents' know-how and the provisions for updating this know-
how and keeping it confidential; 1 0 and (6) the parties' obliga-
tions in relation to licensing technology at dissolution or break-
up of the joint venture and the restriction concerning its subse-
quent use by the parties.1
The Commission summarized its analysis of particular re-
strictions in the agreement under Article 85(1) in the following
manner:
The above analysis has shown that neither the establishment
of Odin nor any of the detailed provisions fall within the
scope of Article 85(1). In fact the individual provisions are
seen to be either: provisions not restricting competition in
the sense of Article 85(1), or provisions which in other con-
texts might restrict competition but which in the context of
the present case do not. Since such provisions cannot be dis-
associated from the creation of Odin without undermining its
existence and purpose and since the creation of Odin does
not fall within the scope of Article 85(1), these specific provi-
sions also fall outside the scope of Article 85(1).112
In concluding that neither the creation of the joint venture nor
any of the related agreements mentioned above restricted com-
petition, the Commission stated that "[f]inally, there are no ex-
plicit restrictions relating price, quantity or territory imposed on
Odin,""'3 thus implying that the inclusion of such a provision
could have resulted in the application of Article 85(1) to the
very creation of Odin or at least to those clauses relating to
Odin's use of the parent's know-how and the maintenance of its
confidentiality.114
This statement in Elopak/Metal Box-Odin raises the question
as to whether these clauses ought to be examined under the an-
cillary restraints theory.1 5 Assuming that Article 85(1) applies
to the contractual relationship between parent companies and
their joint ventures with regard to price, quantity, and territory,
it could be argued that agreements on these matters should be
110. Id.
111. Id. at 20-21, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 843.
112. Id. at 21, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 844.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. This statement also raises the question of whether restrictions of this kind
should fall within the scope of Article 85(1). An examination of this issue, however,
goes beyond the scope of this Article.
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seen as the exercise of the parent's powers to control the joint
venture and, consequently, as inherent to the very creation of
the joint venture.
Following the adoption of the Merger Regulation" 6 and the
legal institutionalization of the distinction between cooperative
and concentrative joint ventures, the Commission has provided
separate guidelines detailing the way in which it intends to apply
the ancillary restraints doctrine in the contexts of concentrative
and cooperative joint ventures respectively." 7
In a Notice defining the scope of Article 3(1) of the Merger
Regulation" 8 ("Undertakings Notice"), the Commission essen-
tially applied the same principles used in the case of the transfer
of an undertaking to ancillary restraints used in the context of
concentrative joint ventures. a19 With respect to non-competition
clauses, however, the Commission stated that to the extent that a
prohibition on the parent's undertakings competing with the
joint venture is an actual withdrawl by the parents from the mar-
ket assigned to the joint venture, it will be recognized as an inte-
gral part of the concentration. '
2 1
In applying these principles, the Commission appears to
subscribe to the view that non-competition clauses imposed on
the parent companies of a joint venture do not restrict competi-
tion because they do nothing more than reflect the economic
reality of their lasting withdrawal from the market and, conse-
quently, they do not appreciably restrict competition.1 2 ' Thus,
the analysis of the need to preserve the legitimate interest of the
parent companies in protecting the value transferred to the joint
venture appears to play no role in the appraisal of non-competi-
tion clauses in the context of concentrative joint ventures. This
is probably explained by the fact that the 1990 Notice was
adopted at a time when the Commission determined that ajoint
venture could be characterized as a concentration only if the
parent companies irreversibly left the joint venture's market and
116. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, supra note 76, OJ. L 257/13 (1990).
117. Id. art. 3(2), 0J. L 257/13, at 17 (1990).
118. Undertakings Notice, 0J. C 203/10 (1990).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 13.
121. SHV/Chevron, 0.J. L 38/14 (1975). See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying
text (analyzing SHV/Chevron decision).
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neighboring markets. 22
The evolution of the Commission's views on concentrative
joint ventures, as codified in its recent Notice of December 31,
1994,12' and the recent developments in its decisional practice
with regard to cooperative joint ventures will no doubt have
some impact on the Commission's analysis of non-competition
clauses in the context of concentrative joint ventures.
The Commission may also be influenced by the Court's re-
cent judgment in the field of cooperatives. In Gottrup-Kim,12 4
the Court held that a provision in the statutes of a cooperative
purchasing association forbidding its members from participat-
ing in other forms of organized cooperation, which are in direct
competition with the cooperative, is not prohibited under Arti-
cle 85(1) of the Treaty so long as this provision is restricted to
what is necessary to ensure that the cooperative functions prop-
erly and maintains its contractual power in relation to produ-
cers. 125 With regard to cooperative joint ventures, the Commis-
sion's approach to ancillary restraints developed in Elopak/Metal
Box-Odin126 has been further confirmed in a number of recent
Commission decisions12 7 and was summarized in its 1993 inter-
pretative Notice ("1993 Notice"). t 28
122. Concentrative Joint Venture Notice, O.J. C 385/2 (1994).
123. Id.
124. Gottrup-Klim v. Dansk Landbrugs, Case 250/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5641.
125. Id. at 1-5659.
126. Elopak/Metal Box-Odin, O.J. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832.
127. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 94/986/EEC, OJ. L 378/37 (1994)
(Philips Osram); Commission Decision No. 94/895/EEC, OJ. L 354/75 (1994) (Inter-
national Private Satellite Partners); Commission Decision No. 94/771/EEC, OJ. L 309/
24 (1994) (Olivetti-Digital); Commission Decision No. 90/446/EEC, O.J. L 228/31,
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 54 (ECR 900).
128. See Cooperative Joint Venture Notice, OJ. C 43/2 (1993). According to this
Notice:
A distinction must be made between restrictions of competition which arise
from the creation and operation of a JV, and additional agreements which
would, on their own, also constitute restrictions of competition by limiting the
freedom of action in the market of the participating undertakings. Such addi-
tional agreements are either directly related to and necessary for the establish-
ment and operation of the JV in so far as they cannot be dissociated from it
without jeopardizing its existence, or are simply concluded at the same time as
the JV's creation without having those features.
Additional agreements which are directly related to the JV and necessary for
its existence must be assessed together with the JV. They are treated under
the rules of competition as ancillary restrictions if they remain subordinated in
importance to the main object of the JV. In particular, in determining the
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It is to be expected that in applying the principles devel-
oped in the 1993 Notice the Commission will follow the more
detailed guidelines contained in the 1990 Notice 129 with regard
to concentrative joint ventures as its recent administrative prac-
tice seems to confirm.
As with the transfer of undertaking cases, the Commission
appears to justify its application of the ancillary restraints doc-
trine in joint venture cases by stressing the need to preserve the
full effectiveness of the transfer of value involved in the creation
of a joint venture. Equally, once the Commission decides that a
restriction must be considered ancillary, no analysis of its impact
on competition is carried out. This is not only true when the
main transaction does not fall under Article 85(1), and also
when the transaction falls under Article 85 (1) but merits exemp-
tion under Article 85(3). This approach has also been followed
in the context of technology and trademark licensing agree-
ments, franchising, and selective distribution systems.
VI. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS
The Commission has also applied the ancillary restraints
doctrine to a number of restrictions on the commercial freedom
of action of undertakings included in patent and know-how li-
censing agreements. Its decisional practice in this field has es-
sentially been codified in both the patent license block exemp-
tion regulation 130 ("Patent Regulation") and the know-how li-
'necessity' of the restriction, it is proper not only to take account of its nature,
but equally to ensure that its duration, subject-matter and geographical field
of application do not exceed what the creation and operation of the JV nor-
mally requires.
If aJV does not fall within the scope of Article 85(1), then neither do any
additional agreements which, while restricting competition on their own, are
ancillary to the JV in the manner described above. Conversely, if a JV falls
within the scope of Article 85(1), then so will any ancillary restrictions. The
exemption from prohibition is based for both on the same principles. Ancil-
lary restrictions require no special justification under Article 85(3). They will
generally be exempted for the same period as the JV.
Additional agreements which are not ancillary to the JV normally fall within
the scope of Article 85(1), even though theJV itself may not. For them to be
granted an exemption under Article 85(3), a specific assessment of their bene-
fits and disadvantages must be made. This assessment must be carried out
separately from that of the JV.
Id. at 13.
129. Undertakings Notice, OJ. C 203/10 (1990).
130. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, OJ. L 219/15 (1984).
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cense block exemption regulation ("Know-how Regulation") .131
The underlying rationale for the application of the ancillary
restraints doctrine in the field of patent and know-how licensing
agreements as in the sale of an undertaking and joint venture
agreements, is the need to protect the transfer of value constitut-
ing the main object of the transaction. In contrast to agree-
ments involving the sale of an undertaking or the establishment
ofjoint ventures, where the value in terms of goodwill and know-
how is generally meant to be transferred, however, technology
transfers are more likely to be rented or shared rather than
transferred or sold. Thus, in the context of technology transfers,
the grantor of the license maintains, after the conclusion of the
license agreement, a legitimate interest in controlling the way in
which the technology is exploited by the licensee, especially
where wrongful use may have detrimental repercussions on the
licensor in terms of remuneration, and/or reputation, or on the
other licensees.13 2
Several types of clauses serve as examples of restrictions im-
posed in patent and/or know-how licensing agreements which
have been scrutinized under the ancillary restraints doctrine. 3
The first type of clause to be examined involves obligations on
the licensee to mark the licensed product with an indication of
the patentee's name, the licensed patent, or the patent licensing
agreement.1 3 4 This clause has been justified on the basis that it
facilitates supervision by the licensor of the quality and quantity
of the products covered by the agreement."3
131. Commission Regulation No. 556/89, O.J. L 61/1 (1989). The draft block
exemption regulation on technology transfer will not be examined in this Article.
Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, O.J. L 359/46 (1988).
132. As shown below, the same rationale also applies to trade-mark licensing agree-
ments, franchising, and selective distribution based on qualitative criteria.
133. Some of the restrictions relating to patent licenses examined in this section
have been cleared by the Commission on the basis of the "scope of patent theory."
According to this theory, those restrictions falling within the specific subject matter of
the intellectual property right involved do not fall under Article 85(1). It is submitted,
however, that the same result could have been achieved by resorting to the ancillary
restraints doctrine, as the Commission's practice in dealing with similar restrictions in
the context of know-how licenses appears to indicate.
134. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 2(1)(6), 0.J. L
219/15, at 19 (1984).
135. See Commission Decision No. 72/26/EEC, J.0. L 13/53 (1972), [1972] 2
C.M.L.R. D127 [hereinafter Burroughs/Geha]; Commission Decision No. 72/25/EEC,
J.0. L 13/50, at 51 (1972), [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. D67 [hereinafter Burroughs/Delplan-
que]. However, in Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Commission, the Court held that such
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A second example is an obligation on the licensee to ob-
serve specifications concerning the minimum quality of the li-
censed product, provided that such specifications are necessary
for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed inven-
tion and to allow the licensor to carry out related checks."3 6 This
type of restriction has been justified as being indispensable to an
appropriate exploitation of the invention.13 7 Specifically, in the
context of know-how licenses, the Commission stated:
The obligations on the licensee to manufacture the products
strictly in accordance with the methods of manufacture com-
municated to him by the licensor, to market the products in
packages strictly conforming to specimens or specifications
proposed by the licensee and accepted by the licensor, and
not to modify the formulae of manufacturing methods with-
out the agreement of the latter, do not fall within Article
85(1) of the Treaty. All these obligations are inspired by the
legitimate desire of the licensor to ensure the strict conform-
ity of the products manufactured by the licensee with his own
products. This is particularly important, because the prod-
ucts carry either the registered trade-mark or the commercial
name belonging to the licensor, and because any change in
the quality of a trademarked product has an effect on the
goodwill of that trade-mark, thus affecting the legitimate in-
terest of its holder. This applies equally to the legitimate in-
terests of the licensor in ensuring that the products manufac-.
tured under licence which contain active chemical ingredi-
ents be packaged in packages providing maximum, transport
security and usability for purchasers. 13
A third type of restriction is an obligation on the licensee
clause "may be covered by the specific subject matter of the patent provided that the
notice is placed only on components protected by the patent." Case 193/83, [1986]
E.C.R. 611, 660, 72, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 489, 537.
136. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 2(1)(9), 0.J. L
219/15, at 20 (1984); Commission Regulation No. 556/89, supra note 131, art. 2 (1)(5),
0.J. L 61/1, at 8 (1989).
137. See Commission Decision No. 72/238/EEC, J.0. L 143/39 (1972), [1972] 1
C.M.L.R. D45 [hereinafter Raymond/Nagoya]. But see Burroughs/Geha, J.O. L 13/53
(1972), [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. D127; Burroughs/Delplanque,J.O. L 13/50 (1972), [1972]
2 C.M.L.R. D67 (relying essentially on scope of patent theory to exclude applicability of
Article 85(1)).
138. Commission Decision No. 88/563/EEC, O.J. L 309/34, at 40 (1988), [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 535, at 546 [hereinafter Delta Chemie/DDD]. See Commission Decision No.
88/143/EEC, 0.J. L 69/21, at 27 (1988), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 527, at 538 [hereinafter
Rich Products/us-rol].
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not to divulge know-how communicated by the licensor during
and after the expiration of the agreement.' In Burroughs-Del-
planque,1 4 0 the Commission permitted restrictions on the licen-
see from divulging know-how on grounds of secrecy. It held
that, "[s] ecrecy is a necessary condition for the owner of techni-
cal. know-how to be able to grant it to other undertakings for its
full exploitation and it is thus a pre-condition for any marketing
of technical know-how, as long as the latter has not fallen into
the public domain."141
A fourth example is an obligation on the licensee not to
grant sub-licenses or assign the license. 142  Although in Bur-
roughs-Delplanque,'43 Burroughs/Geha,14 4 and Davidson Rubber145
the Commission based the non-applicability of Article 85(1) to
restrictions on the scope of the patent theory,1 46 the reasoning
applied by the Commission to the know-how aspect of the li-
cense, based on the need to protect the secrecy of technology
communicated, could equally be used in the context of patent
licenses. 47
139. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 2(1)(7), 0J. L
219/15, at 20 (1984). See Commission Regulation No. 556/89, supra note 131, art.
2(1)(1), 0.J. L 61/1, at 8 (1989).
140. Burroughs-Delplanque,J.O. L 13/50, at 51 (1972), [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. at D67.
141. Id. For know-how licenses see Delta Chemie/DDD, OJ. 'L 309/34, at 40
(1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 546; Rich Products/Jus-rol, 0.J. L 65/21, at 26 (1987),
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 536. In Delta Chemie, the Commission stated:
[T] he commercial value of know-how rests very largely in its confidential char-
acter, and each disclosure brings prejudice to the holder of that know-how.
Such an obligation must be considered to be necessary in the context of the
present type of agreement. Furthermore, since the validity of know-how, is not
limited in time by the expiry of a period of legal protection, as is the case for a
trade mark, it is legitimate for its holder to impose upon a licensee the obliga-
tion to respect its secrecy for so long as this know-how has not entered in the
public domain and is freely accessible to all interested parties.
Delta Chemie/DDD, 0J. L 309/34, at 40 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 546-47.
142. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 2(1)(5), 0.J. L
219/15, at 20 (1984). See Commission Regulation No. 556/89, supra note 131, art.
2(1)(2), 0.J. L 61/1, at 8 (1989).
143. Burroughs-Delaplanque, J.0. L 13/50, at 51. (1972), [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. at
D67.
,144. Burroughs/Geha, OJ. L 13/53, (1972), [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. D127.
'145. Commission Decision No. 72/237/EEC, 0.J. L 143/31, at 35 (1972), [1972] 1
C.M.L.R. D52 [hereinafter Davidson Rubber].
146. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (defining "patent theory" as theory
professing that restrictions falling within specific subject matter of intellectual property
rights do not fall under Article 85(1)).
147. For applicable know-how licensees decisions see Rich Products/Jus-rol, 0.J. L
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A fifth restriction is an obligation on the parties to the
agreement to communicate to one another any experience
gained in exploiting the licensed invention, and to grant one
another licenses with respect to inventions relating to improve-
ments and new applications, provided that such communica-
tions or licenses are non-exclusive.148 The Commission, once
again, relied on the scope of the patent theory to approve this
restriction for patent licenses.' 49 In assessing the legality of this
clause in know-how licenses, however, the Commission con-
cluded that the obligation to communicate all information re-
garding modifications or improvements on a reciprocal and
non-exclusive basis, "gives effect to the legitimate wish of the li-
censor to ensure that the manufacture of the licensed products
by the licensee remains in conformity with the prescriptions rela-
tive to the formulae and methods which he instigated and does
not compromise the maintenance of the quality of the prod-
ucts." ' This rationale could also be used in the patent field.
The sixth type of clause is one that requires the licensee not
to exploit the patent after termination of the agreement, assum-
ing the patent is still in force. 5 ' As in the previous case, the
non-applicability of Article 85(1) to this clause can be justified
on the basis of both the scope of the patent theory and the ancil-
lary restraints doctrine. As the Commission noted in Delta
Chemie:
[T]he undertaking must therefore be able to limit in time the
grant of its know-how and to refuse its use by a licensee at the
expiry of the agreement. Although such an obligation has as
a consequence the removal of the licensee from the market
for the licensed products at the expiry of the agreement the
necessary conditions for the transfer of technical knowledge
69/21, at 26 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 536-37; Delta Chemie/DDD, O.J. L 309/34,
at 41 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 548-49.
148. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 2(1), O.J. L 219/
15, at 20 (1984). See Commission Regulation No. 556/89, supra note 131, art. 2(1) (5),
O.J. L 61/1, at 8 (1989).
149. See Davidson RubberJ.O. L 143/31 (1972), [1972] 1 C.M.L.R. D52; Raymond
Nagoya, JO. L 143/39 (1972), [1972] 1 C.M.L.R. D45.
150. See Delta Chemie/DDD, O.J. L 309/34, at 40 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at
547.
151. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 2(1)(4), O.J. L
219/15, at 19 (1984). See Kai Ottung v. Klee, Case 320/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1177, [1990]
4 C.M.L.R. 915 (discussing need to carry out full-blown economic analysis before decid-
ing whether post-term-use ban after expiration of patent violates Article 85(1)).
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should prevail. Without these conditions this element of pub-
lic interest may not be safeguarded.'
A final example of these scrutinized contractual provisions
is the obligation placed on the licensee to restrict his exploita-
tion of the licensed invention to one or more technical fields of
application covered by the licensed patent.15 3 In Windsurfing v.
Commission,154 the Court followed the Commission and held that
field of use restrictions can only be justified by quality control
considerations if they come within "the specific subject matter of
the patent."155 This requires that "they relate to a product. cov-
ered by the patent since their sole justification is that they en-
sure that the technical instructions as described in the patent
and used by the licensee may be carried into effect." 56
Despite having made considerable use of the ancillary re-
straints doctrine to permit a significant number of restrictions
commonly found in technology transfer licensing agreements,
the Commission has been reluctant to apply this doctrine either
to the exclusivity of the license or to the different types of territo-
rial protection granted to the licensee.157 Building on the Com-
mission's practice in the context of transfers of undertakings and
joint ventures, however, it could be argued that the recipient of
technology, be it a buyer or a licensee, should be protected from
the competition of the licensor and/or of the "older" licensees
152. Delta Chemie/DDD, OJ. L 309/34, at 41 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 548.
See Rich Products/Jus-rol, OJ. L 69/21, at 26 (1988), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R at 537 (confirm-
ing Delta/Chemie position). See also Commission of the European Communities, Tenth
Report on Competition Policy, at 129 (1981).
153. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, art. 1(1)(3), OJ. L
219/15, at 19 (1984). See Commission Regulation No. 556/89, supra note 131, art.
2(1)(8), 0.J. L 61/1, at 9 (1989).
154. Windsurfing, [1986] E.C.R. 611, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 489.
155. Id. at 655, 45, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. at 533.
156. Id. A somewhat different rationale for justifying the same clause has been
used by the Commission in know-how licenses. See Delta Chemie/DDD, 0J. L 309/34,
at 40 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 549; Rich Products/Jus-rol, 0J. L 69/21, at 26
(1988), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 536-37.
157. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 130, arts. 1(1), 1(1)(3)-(6),
0J. L. 219/15, at 19 (1984). An examination of the question of whether the different
types of territorial protection listed in Article 1 of the patent Regulation could be justi-
fied under the scope of the patent theory as not falling under Article 85 (1) goes beyond
the scope of this Article. Some indications that this might be the case, however, at least
in the Commission's view, can be found in the recent draft block exemption Regulation
for technology transfer licensing agreements. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88,
supra note 131, art. 2(1), 0J. L 359/46, at 49 (1988).
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at least for as long as it objectively needs to assimilate the trans-
ferred technology. Otherwise, either the licensor or the other
licensees, who are already acquainted with the licensed technol-
ogy, could easily jeopardize the full effectiveness of the contract
between the licensor and the new licensee. To be sure, as in the
case of a transfer of an undertaking, such territorial protection
should be limited to what is necessary to effect a proper assimila-
tion of the licensed technology in terms of subject-matter, dura-
tion, and territorial scope. 158
VII. TRADEMARK LICENSING AGREEMENTS
As with technology transfer licensing agreements, the Com-
mission has also applied the ancillary restraints doctrine to a
number of restrictive clauses included in trademark licensing
agreements, in particular, those that guarantee quality control
and the secrecy of the transferred know-how. The Commission
has approved the following clauses: (1) an obligation on the li-
censee to manufacture at plants that are capable of guaranteeing
the quality of the product; 59 (2) an obligation to follow the li-
censor's instructions regarding manufacture and ingredients,
and to purchase certain secret raw materials from the licensor
itself; 60 and (3) an obligation to use the transferred know-how
158. See Louis Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne, Case 27/87, [1988] E.C.R. 1919,
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576.
159. Commission Decision No. 78/253/EEC, OJ. L 70/69, at 74 (1978), [1978] 2
C.M.L.R. 397 [hereinafter Campari]. The Commission notes:
The effect of this restriction ... does not go beyond a legitimate concern for
quality control; further, this obligation upon the licensees does not constitute
an absolute limitation of production to any particular place . . . this type of
agreement as to quality control is very important for the licensor, since the
maintenance of quality is referable to the existence of the trade mark right
Id., [1978] 2 C.M.LR. at 408-09. This compares with Windsurfing, where the obligation
to restrict production to a specific manufacturing plant was within Article 85(1) as the
Court held that the equality control argument does not apply when the manufacturing
of components, as often is the case, are contracted out. [1986] E.C.R. at 666-67, I 104-
10, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. at 531-41.
160. Campari, O.J. L 70/69, at 74 (1978), [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 409. The Commis-
sion states:
Here again, control over the quality of the products manufactured under li-
cense and over their similarity to the original Italian product is in the present
case very important for the licensor, in the sense that it is again bound up with
its interest in the maintenance of quality, which is referable to the existence of
the trademark right.
Id. Although the Commission resorts to both the doctrine of ancillary restraints and
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only for the manufacture of the contractual product and to keep
all know-how provided confidential.'
In Moosehead/Whitbread,1 62 the Commission justified the
non-applicability of Article 85(1) to those restrictions on the fol-
lowing grounds:
The know how provisions . . . do not fall under Article
85(1) because the grant of know-how is not exclusive and the
obligations imposed on the licensee are simply ancillary to
the grant of the trademark license and enable the license to
take effect.
In particular the exclusive purchasing obligation regard-
ing yeast set out in paragraph 9(2), does not fall under Article
85(1) because it is necessary to ensure technically satisfactory
exploitation of the licensed technology and a similar identity
between the lager produced originally by Moosehead and the
same lager produced by Whitbread. 163
Here again, the transfer of value, reputation, or know-how,
for example, is at the heart of the Commission's rationale for
applying the ancillary restraints doctrine in the field of trade-
mark licensing.
VIII. FRANCHISING AGREEMENTS
In the context of franchising agreements, the Court and, by
and large, the Commission have considered that a certain
number of clauses can be justified under Article 85(1) on the
basis of the ancillary restraints doctrine. In Pronuptia,164 the
Court held that clauses requiring the franchisee to apply the
franchisor's commercial methods: to sell the franchisor's prod-
ucts only in a store outfitted according to the franchisor's in-
structions, to have all advertising approved by the franchisor, to
locate the store in a certain area, and prohibitions against chang-
ing the location of the store or assigning the franchise agree-
ment without the prior consent of the franchisor did not violate
the scope of the trademark theory, later decisions only refer to ancillary restraints. See,
e.g., Commission Decision No. 90/186/EEC, OJ. L 100/32 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
391 [hereinafter Moosehead/Whitbread].
161. See Moosehead/Whitbread, O.J. L 100/32, at 34 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at
395-96.
162. O.J. L 100/32 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 391.
163. Id. at 35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 398.
164. Pronuptia, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414.
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Article 85(1).165 These restrictions placed on the franchises
were considered necessary to preserve the reputation, identity,
trademark, and name of the franchisor.
More specifically, the Court found the obligation to
purchase products exclusively from the franchisor or a source
approved by it, necessary to protect the identity and reputation
of the franchise network, provided the franchisees could obtain
these products from each other and that the formulation of
quality standards would be impractical, or, if practical, where
such standards, due to the large number of franchises, could not
efficiently be enforced. 6 Similarly, the prohibition against
opening a second shop that conducts business in competing
products during the term of the agreement and for a reasonable
period thereafter was justified on the basis that the franchisor's
know-how should not be used for the benefit of the franchisor's
competitors. 167
Conversely, obligations placed on the franchisee not to
compete, not to designate other franchises in the exclusive terri-
tory, and not to permit other franchisees to open a store were
held to violate Article 85(1) in that they amounted to absolute
territorial protection.'68
It has been argued that, as a practical matter, a given area,
unless it is very large, can support only one franchisee. Exclusiv-
ity and territorial protection would appear to be indispensable to
the successful organization of the franchise at least where the
territories are small and the restrictions in question would
amount to no more than ancillary restraints. 9
This analysis, however, does not seem to be correct. The
doctrine of ancillary restraints in EC competition law has been
used essentially to justify the inapplicability of Article 85(1)
where the imposed restriction on the freedom of action of un-
dertakings makes it possible to guarantee the full enjoyment of
the value transferred. The opening of a second, identical, shop
would not harm either the reputation and/or the image of the
network, or the franchisor's know-how. It could only, in some
165. Id. at 379-85, 9-27, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 441-46.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 385-87, 1 28-34, (1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 446-47.
168. Id.
169. J.S. VENrr, PRONUPTIA: ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS - OR UNHOLY ALLIANCES 220
(1986).
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specific cases, jeopardize the financial viability of the franchisee.
If this were the case, for instance because of the small size of the
territories, an exemption could be granted and maybe even a
negative clearance based on the more generous appreciability
test for vertical restraints developed by the Court under Socti
Technique Minire 7° if new entry in under-developed markets is
made possible. The Court's quasi per se analysis can only be at-
tributed to the cumulative effect of the restrictions, absolute ter-
ritorial protection, and to the size of the territories affected by
the restraints in the instant case.
In contrast, resale price maintenance was held to fall within
the scope of Article 85(1) since it was perceived as unnecessary
to protect the uniformity of the franchisor's image. 171 Once
again, the transfer of value in terms such as reputation or know-
how, constitutes the core of the Court's rationale for applying
the ancillary restraints doctrine in the field of franchising.1 72
IX. EXCLUSIVE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION
AGPNEEMEITS
It is sometimes suggested that distribution agreements that
do not fall within Article 85(1) are in a sui generis category, sepa-
rate from both the ancillary restraints doctrine and from the
commercial risk cases.1 73 However, under the theory of ancillary
restraints presented here, according to which ancillary restraints
are considered necessary for the protection of the transfer of
value in an otherwise acceptable transaction from the competi-
tion point of view, it is submitted that a re-categorization of dis-
tribution agreements may be appropriate. More specifically, se-
lective distribution agreements based on qualitative criteria fall
within the ancillary restraints doctrine, while exclusive distribu-
tion and quantitative selective distribution agreements fall
outside this doctrine, being better explained according to the
commercial risk cases. Such a reclassification has the additional
benefit of giving some intellectual coherence to the much criti-
170. Societi Technique Miniire, [1966] E.C.R. at 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
171. Pronuptia, [1986] E.C.R. at 370-71, 1 27, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 445.
172. The Commission followed the Court's approach in both its decision and the
franchising block exemption Regulation. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra
note 131, O.J. L 359/46 (1988).
173. See WHISH, supra note 19, at 236-38.
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cized Commission distinction between qualitative and quantita-
tive selective distribution agreements.
It is well settled in the case-law of the Court that some prod-
ucts or services of a complex nature possess certain characteris-
tics that, in order to be sold to the public in an adequate or
proper manner, require a specialized distribution system. 174 In-
deed, some products may require considerable after-sales serv-
ices, others may require facilities equipped or staff qualified to
demonstrate the product, or to advise consumers regarding the
product. 175 Clearly, many firms are not sufficiently vertically in-
tegrated to enable, or to wish to engage in, such distribution
themselves, or vertical integration is simply not profitable from
an economic point of view. They choose, therefore, to enter
into agreements with specialized distributors to sell their prod-
ucts or services. Such agreements are, like franchising agree-
ments or technology transfers, transactions that may involve the
transfer not only of goods but also of additional value such as the
reputation and/or image of a brand.
These transfers of additional value from producer to distrib-
utor necessitate certain obligations on the part of the distribu-
tor. The producer may, for example, require that the distribu-
tors have certain qualifications in order to provide the after sales
service, to demonstrate the product, and not to sell outside the
network. Without such obligations, the protection of the addi-
tional transferred value of such complex products may not be
possible. Consequently, a whole range of qualitative obligations
relating to the distributor may be regarded as ancillary restraints,
necessary for the transfer of value to occur. Such obligations,
like other ancillary restraints, if proportionate, are also generally
regarded as per se legal in that they do not require a market anal-
ysis to qualify for clearance.
Two examples illustrate the point. In Vieroy & Boch,1 76 the
Commission approved a selective distribution system for ceramic
tableware and porcelain dinner services. 177 Clauses in the agree-
174. AEG v. Commission, Case 107/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3151, 3194, 33, [1984] 3
C.M.L.R. 325, 391.
175. L'Oreal v. DeNieuwe AMCK, Case 31/80, [1980] E.C.R. 3775, 3790-91, 15-
16, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 252.
176. Commission Decision No. 85/616/EEC, OJ. L 376/15 (1985), (1988] 4
C.M.L.R. 461 [hereinafter Villeroy & Boch].
177. Id. at 18, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 467. The Decision notes: "the long life of the
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ment requiring the goods to be displayed in an attractive man-
ner and separating the goods from other makes and types of
products that might be damaging to Villeroy & Boch's reputa-
tion were permitted on the grounds that they were:
[D] esigned simply to improve the appearance of, and assist in
identifying Villeroy & Boch products and avoid any confusion
with similar makes and any equating of Villeroy & Boch prod-
ucts with inferior products capable of detracting from a prod-
uct line on which Villeroy & Boch wishes on the contrary to
confer a certain prestige.178
There is a clear analogy with this obligation, motivated by the
desire to preserve brand value and distinctiveness, and similar
ancillary restraints in trade-mark licensing and franchising
agreements. 179 Furthermore, with respect to the principle that
the producer should verify the qualifications of all specialized
retailers to ensure that the system remains uniform and closed,
the Commission has stated, using language very close to that of
ancillary restraints and the proportionality or necessity test, that:
Inasmuch as it is accessory to the main obligation of speciali-
zation incumbent on the retailer, and contributes to ensuring
compliance with that obligation, the principle that the pro-
ducer should himself control the access of specialized retail-
ers to the network does not go beyond what is necessary to
maintain the network.180
Likewise, in the IBM decision, 18 ' the Commission recognized
that it is important for buyers of personal computers to be able
to obtain information or advice on the nature of the operations
the computer can perform, how to program such computers,
how to select between various products, and the costs and capa-
bilities of different systems.18 2 The Commission also considered
that "it is reasonable that a manufacturer should insist that its
dealers are able to give such information or advice about the
products concerned justifies the legitimate interest of the producer in entrusting their
sale only to retailers who are prepared to undertake after-sales service so as to ensure
continuity of supply to the customer." Id.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 89/94/EEC, O.J. L 35/31, at 8 (1989),
[1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 591 (Charles Jourdan) (discussing franchising agreements).
180. Villeroy & Boch, O.J. L 376/15, at 18 (1985), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468.
181. Commission Decision No. 84/233/EEC, O.J. L 118/24 (1984), [1984] 2
C.M.L.R. 342 [hereinafter IBM].
182. Id. at 27, [1984] 2C.M.L.R. at 347.
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manufacturer's products." t83 The criteria for appointment as an
authorized dealer included possessing an adequately trained
staff, appropriate space for demonstration and display, the abil-
ity to provide technical support and training, servicing facilities,
favorable bankers' references, and compliance with IBM's code
of conduct.184 The Commission, however, did not engage in an
in-depth market analysis and a consideration of each clause in
this context. Instead, it regarded such provisions as outside the
scope of Article 85(1) for the simple reason that these criteria
for selection of dealers "go no further than may reasonably be
thought necessary for the distribution of the products in ques-
tion."' 85
In view of such decisions, it is suggested that qualitative se-
lection criteria in a distribution of a branded complex product
fall within the doctrine of ancillary restraints. In contrast, other
clauses in such distribution agreements, which may also fall
outside Article 85(1) following an economic analysis, do not fall
within this doctrine. For example, a best endeavors clause or an
obligation to stock a full range of products, or agreements relat-
ing to the joint supply of products may, as in Vieroy & Boch,
qualify for negative clearance, 18 6 but only after a full economic
analysis of the market where it is determined that the obligations
do not lead to an appreciable restriction of competition.'8 7
Such clauses do not qualify for automatic exemption simply be-
cause they are ancillary to or reasonably necessary for the trans-
fer of value in the main transaction. Finally, there are some
clauses that may be regarded either as ancillary restraints or as
justified by the commercial risk doctrine. Commitments to re-
sell only to other authorized retailers or to private customers, for
example, may fall into this grey area.1 88
183. Id.
184. Id. at 25, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 344-45.
185. Id. at 27, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 348.
186. Villeroy & Boch, OJ. L 376/15, at 18-19 (1985), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 469.
187. See Commission Decision No. 85/404/EEC, O.J. L 233/1, at 5 (1985), 1
C.M.R. 10701 [hereinafter Grundig] (holding that Article 85(1) prohibits requirement
that retailers display reasonably full range of products and that wholesalers have neces-
sary resources and facilities and stock full range of goods).
188. See Villeroy & Boch, O.J. L 376/15, at 19 (1985), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 470;
Grundig, OJ. L 233/1, at 5 (1985) (finding restrictions on supply to retailers outside
network fall within Article 85(1)). But see Commission Decision No. 80/489/EEC, OJ.
L 120/26, at 27 (1980), [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 274, 275-76 (Krups); Commission Decision
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This brings us to the issue of quantitative restrictions in se-
lective distribution systems and pure exclusive distribution
agreements. The exclusivity obligations imposed in these types
of agreement cannot, it is submitted, be regarded as ancillary
restraints. It could doubtless be argued, however, that, just as
these qualitative restrictions are "necessary" for the transaction
to occur, so exclusive distribution or quantitative restrictions on
distributors may be equally "necessary" for the transaction to
take place. If the distributors are not granted some level of ex-
clusivity, it is argued, they may not enter into a distribution
agreement in the first place. Consequently, it may be claimed
that the proposed separation between quantitative and qualita-
tive distribution systems is simply a distinction without a differ-
ence.
No doubt on some, or even most occasions, this may be
true, and the granting of exclusivity or the introduction of quan-
titative criteria in selective distribution agreements becomes nec-
essary if the distributor is to be persuaded to "make the market"
and engage in the kind of advertising, promotion, and training
that the manufacturer requires. However, this justification is dif-
ferent from the ancillary restraints doctrine in at least two re-
spects. First, whether this exclusivity is necessary requires an
economic analysis of the market. This is not necessary with qual-
itative requirements. Second, while exclusivity is related to the
economic risk that the distributor takes, it is not integral to the
preservation of value, such as the reputation of the manufac-
turer, that is provided by the ancillary restraints. It may be nec-
essary to the transaction, but in a quite a different respect to
which qualitative obligations are necessary.
In short, a selective distribution system based on qualitative
criteria aims to preserve an additional value to the mere transfer
of goods supplied, such as the reputation of the manufacturers
brand. Selective distribution systems based on quantitative crite-
ria normally have a different purpose, providing economic pro-
tection to the distributor for his investment. This is not to say
that quantitative criteria should, or do, also fall outside Article
85(1) on the grounds that, viewed ex ante, they are pro-competi-
tive or that they should remain for assessment under Article
No. 83/610/EEC, O.J. L 348/20, at 22 (1983), [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 219, 222 (Murat)
(citing other exempted selection distribution systems).
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85(3) on grounds of legal certainty. What is suggested here is
simply that they do not fall, unlike qualitative criteria, within the
doctrine of ancillary restraints, since they play a different under-
lying role in the transaction and, consequently, cannot be
cleared without a more or less complex economic analysis. For
this reason, ,it is also submitted that the different treatment of
qualitative and quantitative selective distribution systems under
EC competition law, whether or not it is ultimately justified, is
not as intellectually incoherent as is sometimes supposed.
However, there do remain certain undoubted difficulties
with the jurisprudence relating to selective distribution. A dis-
tributor may, for example, set up a quantitative selective distribu-
tion system for precisely the same reason he sets up a qualitative
system-to preserve the quality of the network or its reputation.
If this is the case, then, logically, the quantitative restrictions
would count as ancillary restraints in such circumstances. The
determination never to treat them as such might be defended
on the grounds that it is impossible to determine in every indi-
vidual case the nature of the motivation behind quantitative re-
straints-whether to reward commercial risk or to protect the rep-
utation and/or the image of the product.
CONCLUSION
It would appear from this non-exhaustive survey that the
theory of ancillary restraints as restrictions necessary for the
transfer of value in various types of transaction conforms rather
well with both the decisions of the Commission and the jurispru-
dence of the Court, at least with regard to certain restrictions.
Furthermore, this survey shows that implementing such a doc-
trine provides a welcome safe harbor of certainty for undertak-
ings that wish to avoid a full blown economic analysis of the mar-
ket.
This Article also demonstrates, however, that some currents
of uncertainty exist, even within the doctrine of ancillary re-
straints. For example, in the context of the transfer of undertak-
ings, the Commission applies the doctrine under Article 85(3)
and not under Article 85(1) when it perceives the main purpose
of the transaction to be something quite different, such as a spe-
cialization agreement. With respect to selective distribution
agreements, if the restraints are ancillary to a distribution agree-
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ment that forms part of a network of similar agreements fore-
closing the market, then the entire agreement may violate Arti-
cle 85(1). i s9
Furthermore, the doctrine of ancillary restraints has not al-
ways been applied explicitly. In the context of agreements for
the licensing of intellectual property, the doctrine has been in-
voked infrequently, as authorities often prefer to use the specific
subject matter theory 9 ' of the intellectual property right in
question. A comparison with the reasoning in the field of know-
how licenses shows, however, that similar clauses in such licenses
are deemed ancillary restraints. It is submitted that this doctrine
would have provided an alternative justification to that of the
specific subject matter right with regard to numerous restrictions
in intellectual property licenses. In relation to joint ventures,
the Commission has, until its recent Notices, shown a similar ret-
icence in making explicit reference to the concept of ancillary
restraints.
Finally, as might be expected, the theory of ancillary re-
straints, defended in this paper, does not perfectly comply with
all of the jurisprudence. For example, it is hard to explain why,
in selective distribution systems, quantitative criteria whose raison
d'etre is the protection of the reputation or image of the network,
rather than providing exclusivity as a reward for the distributor's
commercial risk, should not be viewed as ancillary restraints.
This is particularly puzzling in the light of the fact that such
quantitative criteria, aimed at the preservation of value, have
been approved in analogous franchising agreements.
If ancillary restraints are not merely an ad hoc collection of
clauses, but are united by a common purpose relating to the
preservation of value in a transaction, then to propose that the
doctrine should be extended to cover other restrictions not re-
lated to that objective would appear to be contradictory. How-
ever, the question can be usefully restated as: should we apply
the same test of "necessity," a less demanding test that does not
require a full economic analysis of the market, to clauses other
than ancillary restraints, such as those falling within the "com-
mercial risk" category?
189. Metro v. Commission, [1986] E.C.R. at 3085, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. at 158.
190. See supra notes 130-58 and accompanying text (discussing patent and know-
how licenses).
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It is submitted that, other than in a few well-defined in-
stances, the Court and the Commission are unlikely to take such
a step. These institutions will not wish to restrict their analysis of
what are regarded as potentially anti-competitive restrictions to a
mere necessity test. They are not likely to tie their hands in ex-
amining the competitive impact of such restrictions in light of,
among other things, the business justifications adduced in their
defense. More progress, it is suggested, is likely to be made in
improving the nature and scope of analysis under Article 85(1)
by an expansion of the appreciability test.
Another possibility is to modify the necessity test and allow
for competitive considerations and more detailed economic
analysis in the assessment of ancillary restraints. This would have
the consequence of putting all forms of restrictions on the same
level and subject to the same degree of scrutiny. However, it
would also deprive businesses of the relative certainty that they
currently enjoy with respect to restrictions analyzed under the
necessity test. Consequently, unless or until the economic analy-
sis of restrictions can be undertaken in a more predictable man-
ner, ancillary restraints, it would appear, are here to stay.
